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news aggregatorGunfire in Mali's capital, junta claims controlBAMAKO, Mali (AP) -- Gunfire echoed across Bamako on Tuesday as Malian government troops battled each other, with one side trying to oust soldiers who seized power in a coup over a month ago....
CA8 rejects de facto co-conspirator standing in a vehicleDefendant lacked standing to challenge the stop of a vehicle that he was two blocks away from at the time of the stop and did not argue that he had an expectation of privacy. Art. III standing does not apply. [Like this court had any choice?] United States v. Ruiz-Zarate, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 8682 (8th Cir. April 30, 2012): Ruiz does not argue that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in Morales's truck at the time of the stop. Rather, he contends that he has "standing" to raise a Fourth Amendment challenge because he suffered an injury-in-fact "that is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and likely to be redressed by a favorable decision." Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 591 (8th Cir. 2009) (quotation, citation, and alteration omitted). Our court has previously rejected Ruiz's argument, concluding that this "concept of 'standing' has not had any place in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence ... since the Supreme Court in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978), indicated that matters of standing in the context of searches and seizures actually involved substantive Fourth Amendment law." United States v. Green, 275 F.3d 694, 698 n.3 (8th Cir. 2001) (quotation, alteration, and citation omitted). "Fourth Amendment rights are personal and may not be vicariously asserted." United States v. Randolph, 628 F.3d 1022, 1026 (8th Cir. 2011) (quotation and citation omitted). Thus, to challenge a search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment, "the defendant must show that (1) he has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the areas searched or the items seized, and (2) society is prepared to accept the expectation of privacy as objectively reasonable." United States v. Stults, 575 F.3d 834, 842 (8th Cir. 2009) (quotation and citation omitted). Here, Ruiz-Zarate had no reasonable expectation of privacy in Morales's vehicle, which he neither owned nor was near at the time of the traffic stop. Consequently, Ruiz-Zarate cannot raise a Fourth Amendment claim. Life on board Falklands-bound shipOn board HMS Dauntless, on its way to the Falklands
Romney: Obama 'long on words' 'short on action'CINCINNATI (AP) -- Mitt Romney on Thursday said President Barack Obama is "long on words and short on action" when it comes to fixing the economy....
Sheridan perjury guilt 'unsafe'A Labour MP claims former MSP Tommy Sheridan was wrongly convicted of committing perjury during his defamation action against the News of the World.
New investigations launched into prostitution scandalFlorida ask force looks at 'Stand Your Ground'The Freedom Tower, rising from ashesParties make final push for votesPolitical parties gear up for the final bout of campaigning for the local council elections in Wales, as an opinion poll suggests Labour could make gains.
No 'specific, credible threats' around bin Laden anniversaryKhawaja to continue hunger strikeThe imprisoned Bahraini human rights and political activist, Abdulhadi al-Khawaja, tells the BBC that he will continue his 84-day hunger strike.
CA4: Bailbondsmen have no qualified immunity for trespass and assaultA bailbondsman sued for assault and trespass was not entitled to a qualified immunity defense when he came into plaintiff’s home. He was sued under § 1983 because he had police officers with him. Gregg v. Ham, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 8696 (4th Cir. April 30, 2012)*: Applying the test articulated in Richardson [Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 404 (1997)], we conclude that the history and policy behind the qualified immunity defense do not support extending it to bail bondsmen. First, there is no evidence that bail bondsmen have historically been afforded immunity for their actions. In fact, courts have rejected the notion that bail bondsmen act as an arm of the court or perform a public function. See, e.g., Ouzts v. Md. Nat'l Ins. Co., 505 F.2d 547, 554-55 (9th Cir. 1974) (rejecting the "strange thesis" that a bail bondsman is "an arm of the court"); Fitzpatrick v. Williams, 46 F.2d 40, 40 (5th Cir. 1931) ("The right of the surety to recapture his principal is not a matter of criminal procedure, but arises from the private undertaking implied in the furnishing of the bond."). Second, the policy justifications underlying qualified immunity do not apply to bail bondsmen. See generally Bailey v. Kenney, 791 F. Supp. 1511, 1523-25 (D. Kan. 1992) (concluding that "[w]ith respect to bail bondsmen, the court finds none of the compelling policy reasons that traditionally justify the availability of qualified immunity to state actors performing discretionary functions"). Courts have traditionally afforded qualified immunity to public officials because susceptibility to suit would distract them from performing their public functions, inhibit discretionary action, and deter desirable candidates from performing public service. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 816 (1982). There is no need, however, for qualified immunity to shield bondsmen from suit, as they are not entrusted with a public function. To the contrary, while the law certainly allows a bail bondsman to apprehend a fugitive, that right is exercised in tandem with the obligation of law enforcement to accomplish the same objective. See Bailey, 791 F. Supp. at 1524. Moreover, rather than operating in the interest of public service, the work of a bail bondsman is fueled primarily by a strong profit motive. See Richardson, 521 U.S. at 409-10 (highlighting the importance of "ordinary marketplace pressures"). Accordingly, even if bail bondsmen are entrusted with a public function, the economic incentives inherent in the system would "ensure an ample number of qualified persons willing to assume the occupational risks of apprehending fugitives." Bailey, 791 F. Supp. at 1524. In sum, neither history nor policy support extending the qualified immunity defense to bail bondsmen. Ham is therefore unable to show error, plain or otherwise, based on the district court's jury instruction on a defense to which he was not entitled. Man pleads guilty to manslaughterA Brookeborough man who admitted stabbing to death a former Fermanagh GAA player has his plea of guilty to manslaughter accepted by the prosecution.
Marriage breakdown 'is a scourge'Family breakdown is one of the "most destructive scourges" in modern UK society, says High Court Judge Sir Paul Coleridge as he launches a campaign to champion marriage.
Facebook in organ donation pushThe NHS and social networking site Facebook have joined forces in an attempt to increase the number of organs being donated.
Bin Laden said to have wanted Obama assassinatedWASHINGTON (AP) -- A former Obama administration official says al Qaida leader Osama bin Laden wanted to see President Barack Obama and Gen. David Petraeus assassinated....
VIDEO: Flood warnings after heavy rainParts of England are on high flood alert, with thousands of homes at risk following Britain's wettest April in over 100 years.
N.D.Ga.: In shooting call, protective sweep can go into atticOfficers responding to a shooting call were validly in the defendant’s residence. They did a protective sweep that extended into the attic, and it was valid. Guns and drugs were in plain view in the attic and seized. United States v. Cruz, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59708 (N.D. Ga. March 19, 2012). The inventory of defendant’s car was proper because it was being towed because it would have been left blocking traffic. Defendant’s mother arrived after the inventory started, and the officer was not obliged to let her have it. [Although, I’m sure he could have, but the inventory would still have been valid up until then, like the withdrawn consent after something found.] State v. Pullen, 2012 Ohio 1858, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 1631 (2d Dist. April 27, 2012).* In a search warrant for child sexual exploitation with photographs on a camera, cell phone, or computer, the fact that the victim was referred to as a “juvenile” was enough for probable cause. It would have been better to have listed the DOB of the juvenile, but close enough for government work. The court also chides defense counsel for the lateness of the motion to suppress, but doesn’t rely on that because it invites an IAC claim. [Not to mention the government may not have quickly provided the search warrant materials; try getting them around here sometimes, especially if a state court issued the warrant and the feds are using it.] United States v. Gleaves, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59508 (N.D. Iowa April 27, 2012).* Providence's Pension ShakedownSeven held over terror fundingSeven people have been arrested on suspicion of funding terrorism, the Metropolitan Police say.
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