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I have often asked myself, and heard it asked by others, why so many wealthy people support liberal causes. (This is the flip side of the usual election-year frustration of the liberals with the working classes' clinging to their guns and religion.) In this presidential campaign season, as in 2008, ...

The affidavit for the search warrant in this case was signed before a notary public working for the DA, but not one authorized by a judge in violation of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. A violation of the Rules was not a Fourth Amendment issue, defendant cannot show he was prejudiced, and the court will not order suppression of the evidence. Copley v. Commonwealth, 2012 Ky. LEXIS 26 (March 22, 2012):

Suppression under this test is not warranted in this case because neither prong is satisfied. Copley was not prejudiced by the violation of RCr 2.02 and 13.10. There was no allegation or proof that the search would not have occurred absent the rule violation or that the search was abusive. Nor is there evidence that law enforcement officials deliberately disregarded the rules. Rather, given that Ms. Hardy was a notary public, was generally qualified to administer oaths and was employed by the Commonwealth Attorney's office, and that all other requirements for securing the warrant were carefully observed, such as complying with KRS 15.725(5) by having the Commonwealth Attorney and the County Attorney certify that no judge or commissioner was available, it appears that the violation of Rules 2.02 and 13.10 was simply inadvertent.

The notion of needing to show prejudice is a death knell to nearly any suppression motion. How can you show prejudice from the wrong notary? You can't. The affidavit was sworn and seemingly truthful, that's all that's really required.

In a FIPF case where the gun was the target of a search warrant, the defendant did not show enough to get access to the CI’s identity under Roviaro. The CI was not central to the charge under the government's theory of constructive possession. Here, it was all speculative what the defense was trying to prove. United States v. Anthony, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38123 (D. N.J. March 20, 2012):

Defendant offers a series of contentions for why disclosure is warranted, including: the need to challenge the basis for the warrant; the fact that the informant is the only person who claims to have seen Defendant in possession of the firearm; and the need to investigate Defendant's theory that the informant played a role in framing Defendant. None of these reasons provides a sufficient basis to overcome the qualified privilege.

First, the validity of the search warrant does not turn on the informant's intentions or mental state. ...

Second, the Government does not intend to introduce the informant's testimony at trial in order to prove possession; instead, the Government will present a case for constructive possession. Therefore, there is no need to cross-examine the informant regarding the informant's claimed observations.

The third and final issue is the question of whether disclosure is necessary because the informant's identity is helpful to Anthony's defense involving the gun having been planted by the informant or the informant's co-conspirator. This is the kind of defense theory that does not rise above mere speculation or hope. ...

Roviaro was decided in 1957, yet I still occasionally see charges where the prosecuting attorney charged the defendant with the underlying CI offense thereby making the CI a material witness. They apparently were not paying attention in law school or when reading the file.

Officers pulled guns on defendants and ordered them to sit down, and this was with reasonable suspicion somebody in the group was armed. The district court erred in suppressing the frisk. United States v. Lewis, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 6073 (11th Cir. March 23, 2012):

As the Supreme Court emphasized in Terry itself, a brief stop-and-frisk is permissible, even absent probable cause to arrest, "for the protection of the police officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual." 392 U.S. at 27 (emphasis added). In fact, the very rationale underpinning Terry -- the protection of officer safety and the safety of others nearby, especially from the dangers posed by firearms -- is presented by the facts of this case. We add that the detention took place at night in a high crime area, which, while surely not dispositive, is still another relevant consideration in the Terry calculus. See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124; United States v. Gordon, 231 F.3d 750, 755-56 (11th Cir. 2000). And we further emphasize that, as in Clark, the defendant here was not some "unrelated bystander," Clark, 337 F.3d at 1288, but rather "an associate of [the] persons being investigated for criminal activities," id.

In short, under the totality of the circumstances of this case, the officers were entitled to control the scene and exercise command over the situation in the course of briefly detaining McRae for further investigation. A brief detention of all four associated individuals was reasonable, in light of the substantial risks to the officers' safety. Accordingly, we REVERSE the district court's order granting Lewis's motion to suppress, and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.